relevant materials in the Christian tradition that stress the importance of conversion and transformation for the pursuit of knowledge of God.

In addition, I would like to see a fuller account of the relationship between Christian philosophy and spirituality, especially since Moser thinks that "a Christ-shaped philosophy should be joined with Christ-formed *philosophers*" (169ff.). Undergirding a connection of this sort is a deeper immersion in (perhaps dependence on) a set of spiritual practices. This kind of emphasis resembles the early Christian integration of formation and the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods (for example, knowledge of God, discernment of divine truths, wisdom). Given the current expansion of topics in epistemology, I wonder whether Moser could relocate this project under the category of spiritual formation. The focus here would be on the practices, materials, and processes that are fundamental to the kind of Christian philosophy Moser has in mind.

Notwithstanding these suggestions, Moser's proposal rightly takes its place in the intersection of theology and philosophy. It creates space for attending more fully to epistemological issues that crop up within theology.

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God and Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled with Pain. Edited by Chad Meister and James K. Dew, Jr. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity, 2013. 360 pages. $20.00.

God and Evil serves as an excellent introduction to the problem of evil. Further, it goes beyond most works on the topic by addressing related issues including divine hiddenness, original sin, evolution, and hell. Written with the educated lay reader in mind, it is a perfect text to be used in an introductory course on philosophy of religion, apologetics, or the problem of evil at the undergraduate or seminary level.

The book begins with two excellent essays on the evidential (chapter 1) and logical (chapter 2) problems of evil, followed by a third essay, by Bruce Little, on "God and Gratuitous Evil." This third essay seems out of place, located within Part 1, which sets out to answer the question, "What is evil and why is it a problem?" It would have been better to include, in place of Little's essay, a tightly argued essay on the emotional problem of evil. In doing so, the reader would be properly introduced to the main variants of the problem of evil and adequately prepared to navigate the discussion to follow in the subsequent essays. Worse, Little's essay suffers in key places, which could lead the uninitiated reader into confusion. Typically, the theist rejects premise (2) of the evidential argument,

(2) Gratuitous evil exists,

either by providing God's morally justified reason for permitting evil (that is, giving a theodicy) or, as Ganssle and Lee do in their essay in chapter 1, by arguing that God has a morally justified reason for allowing evil even if we humans are not privy to it (that is, skeptical theism). Little, on the other hand, rejects premise (1) of the evidential argument,

(1) If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist,

arguing that the reality of gratuitous evil wouldn't subvert God's existence or moral perfection. In his essay, Little seems unaware of the skeptical theistic option as a response to premise (2) and thus thinks there is an "excessive burden of proof" that rests on the theist to provide a theodicy if premise (1) is granted. Yet Little offers, in the place of a greater good theodicy, his own "creation-order" theodicy in which "God allows us to make real choices with real consequences because he respects his own created order" (46). If humans have significant freedom, "this makes gratuitous evil a real possibility" (46). But, if God allows such evil *because* it "seems to be the only authentic way we can have a personal and meaningful love relationship with God" (45), then it seems such evil is *not* gratuitous, and Little's thesis is undercut.

Moving on, in Part 2 reasons are explored that might explain why God allows evil. In chapter 4, Garry DeWeese offers a "Free Process" defense of natural evil, arguing that the phenomenon of "chaos systems" helps us to understand why the world is such that natural evil occurs. In chapter 5, Doug Geivett explores and defends the Augustinian account of evil as a privation brought about by the misuse of creaturely freedom. In chapter 6, James Spiegel discusses the Irenaean soul-making theodicy. Helpfully, Spiegel brings together the freewill and soul-making theodicies, arguing that they are best understood not as competing but as complementary alternatives. To wit, the freewill theodicy is backwards looking, explaining the origin (and continued presence) of evil, whereas the soul-making theodicy is forward-looking, explaining the eventual goods that can be achieved through suffering. The final essay in Part 2 (chapter 7), by Jill Hernandez, explores Leibniz's controversial claim that this world is the best of all possible worlds. Hernandez argues that a best-of-all-possible worlds theodicy is compelling because it preserves God's moral perfection, human freedom, and the Christian hope that all will be made right in the face of evil.

Part 3 is composed of eight essays (chapters 8–15) on "evil and other relevant themes." Readers looking for a first-rate introduction to the problem of divine hiddenness will not be disappointed in Meister's treatment of the topic in chapter 10. So too with Corduan's interesting essay on "Evil in Non-Christian Religions" (chapter 13) where it is argued that only in Christianity is the full corruptive power of evil acknowledge and remedied, Beck's discussion of new atheism (chapter 14) where the works of Richard Carrier, Richard Dawkins, and Sam Harris are shown to contribute nothing innovative to the discussion of God's existence and fail miserably in accounting for

evil, and Ganssle's tightly argued essay (chapter 15) on how evil fits better with Christianity than it does with atheism. Essays of special note in Part 3 are the two essays by Copan on sin (chapters 8 and 9) and the essays by Taliaferro (chapter 11) and Habermas (chapter 12) that provide the believer with practical guidance on how to live in the face of evil and suffering.

Copan asks, in chapter 8, how the first—or primeval—sin arose in a good world? Possible answers surveyed include the hyper-Calvinism of R. C. Sproul Jr. and the claim that God caused the first sin so that he would have the opportunity to display the divine attribute of wrath, a more moderate Calvinism which (opaquely) argues that while God is not the author of sin, still human sin springs from the mysterious will of God's ordaining sovereignty, and finally, the view that human misuse of freedom is responsible for the appearance of sin in the world. Copan expertly argues that both versions of Calvinism are problematic and that the "free creatures" response best captures the clear teaching of Scripture and our moral intuitions regarding human responsibility. In chapter 9, Copan picks up the question of whether justice and human sinfulness are at odds by examining the doctrine of original sin. Copan argues that original sin is contingent, universal, radical, and communicable. Two traditional accounts of how sin is communicated from Adam to his descendants are the "imputed guilt" and "damaged" view. Copan argues for the damaged view such that humans inherit an inborn self-centered tendency toward sin. Importantly, according to Copan, Adam's transgression doesn't confer his guilt on us by virtue of our being conceived; our guilt is conditional, based on our actual (albeit inevitable) committing of sinful acts. Given God's genuine offer of salvation to all people, sufficient for all but efficient for those who freely come to Christ, human sinfulness is rendered compatible with justice.

Taliaferro identifies ways in which prayers, including traditional prayers, may be used as special weapons in times of trouble. I was personally challenged by his example of praying almost twice a day (while aiming for four) through set prayers within *The Book of Common Prayer* for the past thirty-five years. One can't help but think that such a consistent practice of faithful prayer—petitionary, adoration, thanksgiving, and so forth— deepens one's walk with Christ and one's ability to find strength and comfort from evil's sting. Likewise, I was challenged by Habermas as he shared a conversation he had with God as his wife was dying of cancer. After reflecting on the fact that suffering is at the very center of the Christian gospel, most notably Jesus's intense physical and emotional pain on the cross, Habermas discusses two very difficult questions asked of him by God: "Do you (or your loved one, or person X) deserve to suffer any less than my Son did?" and "If my Son had to learn from his suffering, and be completed by it, are you able to learn more quickly and more thoroughly without the suffering?" The truth,

which is a balm for our pain, is that suffering in this world is inevitable, God cares even if we don't feel it, and one day, all tears will be wiped away.

In Part 4, "Issues in Dialogue," we find three sets of essays on the topics of hell, evolution, and God's existence with respect to evil. William Lane Craig defends Christian exclusivism (chapter 16)—the view that people are saved on the basis of Christ's work and through explicit faith in Christ—whereas Kyle Blanchette and Jerry Walls defend a kind of inclusivism (chapter 17)—the view that people are saved on the basis of Christ's work and not always through explicit faith in Christ—in which the postmortem salvation of sincere seekers is possible. Provocatively, Blanchette and Walls argue that exclusivism is inconsistent with the perfect love of God. To argue that God is satisfied in "giving everyone their cold day in court" is "just not consistent with the New Testament depiction of God's love toward fallen humanity, nor is it consistent with our deepest and best moral intuition about what a perfectly good God would do" (246). God's perfect love requires that he provide "optimal grace" such that all sinners are provided with "the individual graces that will make it most likely that they will be saved" (251). God pursues the sincere seeker (Gandhi is their favorite example of a poorly evangelized yet sincere seeker of God/Jesus?) even into the afterlife, removing stumbling blocks to faith up until the point that salvation is decisively and irrevocably rejected.

I do not find myself convinced by Blanchette and Walls argument. Is there anything more "optimal" that God's Son laying down his life for the forgiveness of sins? How is more time supposed to help here? How is Jesus's pursuing love different in the afterlife and how is it that man's genuine moral freedom is preserved in this postmortem pursuit? Further, if God has middle-knowledge (as Craig argues), could he not providentially arrange the world such that all sincere seekers would receive sufficient grace to put them in a position to positively respond to the gospel? The key issue is whether or not everyone has a full and fair chance to receive salvation. Blanchette and Walls think not, whereas Craig thinks so.

The next set of essays address the question of whether or not the reality of evolution makes the problem of evil easier or more difficult to solve for the theist. William Dembski argues that evolution makes the problem worse (chapter 18) whereas Karl Giberson and Francis Collins argue that it helps (chapter 19). What best explains the reality and complexity in nature of structures that appear designed to inflict pain and induce death? The answer, according to Giberson and Collins, is evolution. Nature has built-in creative powers and a kind of unpredictability that result in natural evils. Nature is "free" in a way analogous to human freedom. Thus, "God is off the hook" (280) since it is nature's freedom which leads to the unpleasant aspects of our world. In response, Dembski argues that nature is not "free" in the relevant sense: "Our freedom carries with it moral responsibility. But what moral

responsibility attaches to nature's freedom? Does it make any sense to say that nature *does* this but *ought to* do that?" (266) The answer, according to Dembski, is no. Further, what nature does is entirely the result of the capacities God has given it. The causal buck stops with God and evolution doesn't make the problem of evil any easier. In fact, the inherent cruelty of evolution makes the problem worse.

Finally, the appendix includes the transcript of a debate between William Lane Craig and Michael Tooley on the existence of God. Tooley focuses primarily on the problem of evil in building his case for atheism and thus the reader is treated to the most prominent objection against theism from the mouth of a leading atheistic philosopher.

I highly recommend *God and Evil*. Each essay can be read in isolation and together they serve as a robust introduction to the many faces of evil and the resources within theism for responding to the resultant challenges.

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Sam Harris. *Free Will*. New York: Free Press, 2012. 96 pages. $9.99.

Free will is an illusion. Or so says Sam Harris in his most recent book entitled *Free Will*. Harris is perhaps best known for his books *The End of Faith* and *Letter to a Christian Nation*. In *Free Will*, Harris argues that neuroscience and psychology tell us that the popular conception of free will is an illusion. Harris also claims that free will cannot be made conceptually coherent. He states, "Either our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them" (5). Right from the start, Harris links free will with moral responsibility (more on this later).

When Harris says that free will is an illusion, he means that the popular conception of free will is an illusion. He notes that this conception of free will rests on two assumptions: "(1) that each of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present" (6). Harris asserts that the only way we could have behaved differently is if we would have been caused to act differently by unconscious mental states and that we cannot be the conscious source of our volitions because they arise within us spontaneously (8).

Right from the start, there are two problems with Harris's characterization of the popular concept of free will. First, it's not clear where he gets his ideas about free will. He cites no studies or empirical data of any kind to back up his claims about the popular concept of free will. This is important, especially for a scientifically minded person like Harris, because the "popular concept of free will" is an empirical matter. With a plethora of research being done in