How Does an Aristotelian Substance Have Its Platonic Properties? Issues and Options

Paul Gould

Abstract Attempts to explicate the substance-property nexus are legion in the philosophical literature both historical and contemporary. In this paper, I shall attempt to impose some structure into the discussion by exploring ways to combine two unlikely bedfellows—Platonic properties and Aristotelian substances. Special attention is paid to the logical structure of substances and the metaphysics of property exemplification. I shall argue that an Aristotelian-Platonic account of the substance-property nexus is possible and has been ably defended by contemporary philosophers.

Key Words Aristotelianism · Bare particular · Constituent ontology · Exemplification · Loux · Moreland · Property · Platonism · Relational ontology · Substance

Assume that familiar substances such as dogs, trees, and persons have properties. Further, assume that properties are not metaphysical constructions from some other kind of entity but are sui generis (i.e., they admit of their own ontological category): they are Platonic.¹ Minimally, to be a Platonic property is to be an abstract necessarily existing entity that confers character on the things that have it. So far, so good. But then, how exactly does a substance have its properties? As it turns out, providing a plausible metaphysical story about how members of the abstract realm relate to concrete things in the universe is no easy task. In order to grasp the difficulty of the task at hand, consider the following set of claims regarding substance and properties:

INCONSISTENT TRIAD
(1) Substances are logically prior to their metaphysical and physical parts.
(2) Properties are Platonic.
(3) If properties are Platonic, then they are logically prior to their exemplification in substances.
Each claim can be independently motivated, yet together they (apparently) form an inconsistent set. Claim (1) is an endorsement of a broadly Aristotelian understanding of substance that many find intuitively attractive. Claims (2)-(3) represent a common understanding of properties, and many argue that such a view of properties is also well motivated (if not intuitive). Is it possible to combine an intuitively attractive account of substance (i.e., Aristotelianism) with a well-motivated understanding of properties (i.e., Platonism)? Many assume that the tension set out in Claims (1)-(3) is real, i.e., either Aristotelianism regarding substance needs to be rejected (Claim 1) or Platonism regarding properties needs to be rejected (Claims (2)-(3)). Indeed, if logical priority is an asymmetric relation and there is only a single sense of logical priority, then Claims (1)-(3) are obviously contradictory. In this paper, I shall argue that an Aristotelian-Platonic account of the substance-property nexus that endorses Claims (1)-(3) is possible when properly understood. To achieve this result, I shall proceed as follows. In Section 1, I shall set up the discussion by explicating each of the Claims (1)-(3) and showing how my own Platonic Aristotelian can resolve the apparent inconsistency in INCONSISTENT TRIAD; in Section 2, I shall distinguish two distinct styles of metaphysical explanation and explicate various framework constraints for each approach; and finally, in Section 3, I shall summarize the views of two Platonic Aristotelians who endorse Claims (1)-(3) and outline the metaphysical costs and benefits to each distinctive approach to the substance-property nexus. The result will be that it is possible to be a Platonic Aristotelian regarding the substance-property nexus.

1. Setting up the Discussion and Resolving the Tension

Regarding Claim (1), there are many different meanings of the English word ‘substance’. Still there is a common core of characteristics that have been traditionally ascribed to paradigm
substances such as trees, dogs and persons. In what follows, I shall limit the term ‘substance’ to such paradigm examples, i.e., living beings that exhibit a natural, as opposed to artificial, unity. Call such paradigm examples ‘substances’ and all other concrete particulars (e.g., tables, chairs, statues, watches, etc.) ‘artifacts’. To say that a substance has a natural unity is to say, minimally, that it is so united independently of human thought or decision. Of course, whether there is in fact such a natural principle of unity is controversial, and it is difficult to argue for such a principle apart from simply pointing out that we do seem to have knowledge of naturally occurring (biological) kinds and our conception of these kinds is fairly insensitive to changes in scientific theory. I shall assume such a natural principle of unity exists in substances. Following Aristotle, I also assume that a substance does the having of properties and not vice-versa. Hence, the *having* relationship is asymmetrical and substances are foundational (i.e., properties can not stand in the first position of an asymmetric relation of having to a substance). In this paper, I shall concentrate on the properties of the substance and not higher-order properties such as properties of properties of the substance and so on.

One characteristic of substances that I find intuitively plausible and satisfying can be expressed as follows:

(S) Substances are fundamental unities, logically prior to all of their metaphysical and physical parts.

And of course, principle (S) is one way of explicating Claim (1). How is principle (S) to be understood? To say of some x that “x is fundamental” is to say that it is basic or ultimate relative to a target. The target in view in (S) is unity. Hence, substances are basic unities in which the unity of the whole does not supervene somehow on facts about its parts. As a fundamental unity, a substance “enjoys a certain natural completeness or rounded-offness” (Smith 1997: 108) not enjoyed by artifacts or aggregates such as a heap of salt. The notion of ‘physical part’ is easy
enough to understand—things like hands, a heart, and feet are physical parts of a substance. A metaphysical part shall be understood as any non-physical object possessed by the substance, such as its properties. The notion of logical priority will loom large in the discussion to follow and for this reason will receive a bit of an extended introduction.

According to Michael Bergmann and Jeff Brower, logical priority is associated with a special kind of dependence. To cite a couple examples: the parts of a watch are logically prior to the whole (i.e., the watch), the thinker is logically prior to its thoughts. Bergmann and Brower state: “If an object \( a \) is logically prior to an object \( b \), then \( b \) depends for its existing on \( a \) (in a way that \( a \) doesn’t depend on \( b \)” (ibid. 368). The important point is that logical priority is an asymmetric relation that cannot be mutual. As such, logically priority must be sharply distinguished from being a necessary condition of which isn’t necessarily asymmetric (e.g., any pair of necessary truths is such that each is a necessary condition of the other) and entailment (e.g., the existence of any necessary being entails the existence of any other necessary being) since again, logical priority cannot be mutual. Bergmann and Brower think that the most illuminating way to understand logical priority is in terms of explanation: \( a \) is logically prior to \( b \) if \( a \) at least partially explains \( b \) whereas \( b \) is not even a partial explanation of \( a \) (ibid. 369).

Of course, there are different senses of explanation. For starters, there is:

* **Causal explanation**: e.g., The ball flying through the window (partially) explains why the window is broken;

* **Metaphysical explanation**: e.g., That \( a \) and \( b \) are gold is (partially) explained by the property *being atomic number 79*; Socrates is (partially) explained by the property *being human*;

* **Conceptual explanation**: e.g., The vase being colored is (partially) explained by its being red; Thorsten’s being my brother-in-law is (partially) explained by his being married to my sister.

But, if there are different senses of explanation (as seems obvious from the above examples),
then it is reasonable to suppose that there are different senses of logical priority. So, what sense of logical priority is in view in (S)? To answer that question, it is important to note that there seems to be top-down causation and explanation exhibited in substances. Consider living organisms, (i.e., paradigm examples of substances). On one particularly prominent story (i.e., the Aristotelian story), substances function teleologically such that the “natures [of the substance] impose a top-down organization on the members of the relevant kind in the sense that the nature dictates a specific pattern of functional organization in which the various organic parts of a living being get their identity from the role they play in the overall functional economy imposed by the nature” (Loux 2006a: 246). On this view, it is because the composite living being is a member of its proper biological kind that its parts have the properties they do. On the Aristotelian view, a substance’s inner nature, or essence, brings into being within the substance all of its metaphysical and physical parts (including its essential and contingent properties). Thus the logical priority in view is a kind of causal explanation, and the causation at work here is an instance of final causation.

Why accept (S)? The first thing to note is its pre-theoretical pull—(S) offers an intuitively satisfying account of substance. The second thing to notice is that this isn’t much of an argument. Still, for those who share (with me) this intuition or who think that there is genuine teleology in substances, the fact that substances are deeper unities that artifacts count in favor of principle (S). I offer the following argument to push us in the direction of accepting principle (S).

First, consider the fact that particular substances are natural unities of discrete wholes that possess a natural grouping of properties (i.e., Fido possess the properties being a dog, being brown, being 25 pounds, and being amiable, but not the property being a fish, being bi-lingual, and being the president). This natural grouping of properties within a substance is sometimes
called adherence\textsuperscript{10}—properties adhere together in a substance as a deep unity (a unity deeper than a heap of sand, or even the unity of an artifact such as a car). Further, the adherence of properties in a substance, according to Richard Connell, can only be explained in two possible ways: either the properties are grouped together through their substance (i.e., principle S); or properties are grouped together directly one to another and then tied to a featureless bare substratum (i.e., the denial of principle S).\textsuperscript{11} The first option provides a very natural explanation of adherence: properties are grouped together and form a natural unity because they are brought about by the substance’s nature. The second option cannot adequately account for property adherence. Rather, it amounts to the claim that a substance possesses all its properties indifferently. Or to put it another way, the substance itself has no nature that specifies which properties it will possess. There is no ready-made answer to the question: why are these properties (instead of those properties) grouped in this substance (instead of that substance). As Connell argues, the substance is indifferent as to whether the properties are found in it or not “much as sitting is a property that can come and go in men, and as the shape of Hercules can come and go in clay” (1988: 91). To avoid that unhappy scenario, Connell recommends instead that

we are forced to admit that a constant set of properties [as well as the total set] which inheres in a substance also stems from it, which is to say that the subject is not only passively related to the properties but actively as well; it is active not in the sense that the substance is an agent that acts to produce the property, but in the sense that the substance is the actual root of the property within it. The [having of a determinate] property can depend upon only a determinate interior of the substance, not on an interior that is featureless or bare. (ibid. 92, italics added)

Connell’s point is this: on the first approach (call it the Aristotelian approach), properties are logically posterior to the whole and the inner nature of the substance “brings about” the properties possessed by the substance (this is the part in his quote about a determinate interior of the substance). Of course, the exemplification of essential properties will be temporally
simultaneous with a substance’s coming into being; nevertheless, the proximate cause of the properties being possessed by the substance will be the substance’s inner nature. Thus, a substance’s essence isn’t a set of its essential properties. This view is at home with the medieval approach to substance where, as Wolterstorff says: “The nature of an entity…is what-it-is-as-such. An entity does not have a certain nature in the way it has a certain property. It is a certain nature” (1991: 541). On the second view, the properties of a substance are logically prior to the whole and attach to a featureless or bare substratum that is indifferent to which properties are had by it (this is the part in Connell’s quotation about an interior that is featureless or bare). But then (on this second, call it the Lockean approach), there is no obvious explanation for the natural grouping of properties exhibited by substances as well as the deep unity we find. It’s as if there were two buckets, one with a bunch of bare substratums and one with properties and someone (or some natural process?) were reaching into both buckets, grabbing a bare substratum and bunch of properties and then connecting them (through an exemplification machine of course). If this picture (which is obviously metaphorical) is at all analogous to what is going on in the case of substance, then the unity of the substance is externally imposed on the substance and thus not fundamental to the substance. Perhaps something analogous to this takes place with artifacts. But substances are a deeper unity of properties than artifacts. This fact is left unexplained (or under-explained) on the second approach. Hence, principle (S) best explains the adherence of properties possessed by a substance. And if one thinks that a substance is a deeper unity than an artifact, then there is at least one good reason to endorse principle (S).

Principle (S) is intuitively attractive, so much so that it is part of what Michael Ayers calls the traditional view of substance: “the principle that substances are real or natural unities identifies what is perhaps the most fundamental feature of the category of substance” (1991: 72).
And as Jonathan Schaffer recently stated, “Aristotle’s notion of substance, developed in the *Categories*, is multifaceted. But perhaps the core notion is that of a basic, ultimate, fundamental unit of being” (2009: 351). Loux claims that principle (S) is a descendent of an approach to substance that is expressed in many passages of Aristotle, where “he insists that substances are fundamental unities which cannot be reduced to more basic sorts of things” (1978: 165).

Principle (S) has a rich history, a broadly Aristotelian history. As such, I shall call my account of substance, which minimally includes (S) and all that (S) entails, a broadly Aristotelian account of substance (setting aside the issue of whether or not Aristotle himself endorsed (S) for constituents other than physical parts).

Regarding (2), I say, Platonism regarding properties is well motivated. It is often maintained that one of the primary motivations for Platonism regarding properties is its *explanatory superiority* over its nominalistic competitors in accounting for various phenomena such as resemblance facts, subject-predicate discourse, and abstract reference. A further motivation for Platonism regarding properties, it is argued, is its *usefulness*—Platonic properties do all kinds of work in explicating the relationship between mind, language, and world. Hence, Claim (2) is well motivated and I shall assume its truth hereafter.

Regarding (3), recall that Platonic properties explain the character things have. Hence, there is a sense then in which properties are logically prior to the substance. But they can’t be logically prior in the same sense of priority employed in principle (S), for according to that principle, all of a substance’s parts (which ranges over properties possessed by a substance) are logically posterior to the whole. The explanation in view is *metaphysical*, hence the sense of logical priority is different there than it is in principle (S). Platonic properties, as necessarily existing entities are ontologically prior to their exemplification within a (contingent) substance.
(recall, *being a necessary condition of* something doesn’t entail logical priority, hence I shall use the following locution to explicate ontological priority: if entity x is a necessary condition for the existence of entity y, then x is ontologically prior to y). So, Platonic properties are ontologically prior to the contingent substances that have them, further, since they partially explain the character of the thing that has them, they are also logically prior in the metaphysical sense explicated above. Still, the substance is fundamental and determines, in light of its nature, which properties (both essential and otherwise) it will possess. Given principle (S), the substance is a unified whole, and all explanation of the substance’s character ultimately terminates at the level of the whole (and doesn’t go through the substance to some more ultimate entity).

With two different senses of logical priority employed in Claims (1) and (3), the apparent tension of INCONSISTENT TRIAD has been removed. In one sense, a substance is logically prior to all of its metaphysical and physical parts (*causal sense*), in another, the properties exemplified by a substance are logically prior to the substance (*metaphysical sense*). Since two senses of logical priority are employed, there is no real tension in INCONSISTENT TRIAD. What remains then, is to further characterize how substances, so construed, exemplify properties according to two prominent styles of metaphysical explanation.

**2. Two distinct styles of metaphysical explanation**

Minimally, to exemplify a property is to possess or have a property. This much, most philosophers can agree on. But, specifying how a substance possesses a property and assessing the metaphysical costs of a mature theory of property possession takes the metaphysician into deep and complicated matters, as we shall now see.

The task of explaining why substances have the character they do has a rich philosophical history. Broadly speaking, two distinct styles of metaphysical explanation can be discerned.
Aristotle tells us that the items (intuitively) had or possessed by sensible particulars can be understood to exist either “separate from the sensible things” or “present in them” (996a15-16). More recently, Nicholas Wolterstorff speaks of relational and constituent ontologies. Aristotle’s and Wolterstorff’s distinction is meant, it seems, to mark out the same contrast. The expressions “in” and “separate” can be used to mark a variety of contrasts, but the operative contrast in these two distinct styles seems to be as follows: to be in a thing is to be a proper constituent of the thing, whereas to be separate is to exist apart from the thing. As Loux points out, the force of “separate” here is parasitic on its opposition to “in.”

Both approaches tell us that substances exhibit whatever character they have in virtue of properties had by it. However, the two approaches differ in their account of how character exhibition is to be explained. Those who endorse the constituent approach tell us that the familiar substances of our everyday experience exhibit their character in virtue of their constituent metaphysical and physical parts (where a metaphysical part is meant to range over properties that are in the substance). On the relational approach, by contrast, familiar substances exhibit their character through objects that are not immanent in those substances. Rather, as Aristotle puts it, they exist “apart from the sensibles,” and it is in virtue of standing in some non-mereological relation to those objects that the familiar substances exhibit the character that they do.

Proponents of the two strategies differ, then, in their characterization of familiar substances. Those who follow the constituent approach endorse a view of familiar substances in which the whole is more than its common-sense mereological parts. The relational ontologist, on the other hand, will argue that familiar substances exhibit a common-sense mereological structure—the only parts that familiar substances have are their common-sense parts. In general,
we can characterize these two distinct styles of metaphysical explanation as follows: a constituent ontology

aims at a general characterization of substances in terms of various types of constituents which are in some straightforward sense intrinsic to them and compatible with their status as unified wholes.

whereas, a relational ontology

aims at a general characterization of substances in terms of their relations to entities (e.g., Platonistically conceived universals or properties, including essences and natures) that have their being and reality independently of those substances. These natures and characteristics of substances are in some obvious way extrinsic to them and linked to them by the relation of exemplification or participation. On such a view all individuals are in some sense lacking in intrinsic composition at any level other than that of material parts.

Wolterstorff claims that the medievals worked within the style of constituent ontology, whereas the majority of 20th century philosophers (especially those working in the analytic tradition) assume a relational approach. “The pattern is clear,” says Wolterstorff: “twentieth century ontology is relentlessly relational in its style. We don’t think of entities as being composites of constituents but as standing in multiple relationships with other entities” (1991: 548). When Wolterstorff made these comments in 1991, they might have been true. In any case, I don’t think they are accurate today. In fact, there seems to be a bit of a pendulum swing towards a constituent approach in ontology. Contemporary defenders of the constituent approach to property exemplification include inter alia Gustav Bergmann, David Armstrong, Andrew Newman, JP Moreland, and Barry Smith.

It is natural to think that the constituent and relational approaches to ontology map onto the debate regarding properties in a straightforward way (indeed, the above characterization by Smith suggests as much). If Platonism regarding properties is true then one ought to follow the relational approach to metaphysics. To think that abstract objects can be considered as
constituents in familiar substances is to make a category mistake. On the other hand, if properties are best understood in some other manner, e.g. “ways things are” or concrete tropes, then the philosopher ought to follow the constituent approach. It is also natural to think that as stated, the classification of ontological theories of property exemplification might seem to be both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. But, it is neither. For one thing (as Loux points out), there are certain philosophers, i.e., extreme nominalists, who think that facts expressed in our everyday character ascriptions are irreducibly basic and thus in no need of explanation. And for those philosophers who do embrace the metaphysical project underlying the two distinct approaches, it is possible to construct a hybrid theory. Consider, for example, a two-step theory that makes tropes constituents of substances, where the trope exemplifies Platonic properties in the relational way (hence the properties are not constituents of any object at all). Loux admits that such a hybrid theory is possible, yet “a theory invoking both patterns of explanation strikes us as redundant” and hence, “the natural choice” is to follow either a constituent or relational approach for substances (2006a: 212).

Are there decisive reasons in favor of one approach instead of the other? Certainly, proponents of either view think so. But, knockdown arguments rendering one view conclusively better than another remain elusive. Both sides offer familiar charges against the other: the relational ontologist charges the constituent ontologist of a category mistake; in the same spirit, the constituent ontologist charges the relational ontologist with failing properly to ground the character of familiar substances and with failing to specify how beings like us can acquire knowledge of non-spatiotemporal entities. Proponents of both views argue that any hybrid accounts are redundant. And so on. Loux suggests that what is needed is “tolerance in ontology.” Perhaps all we can do is
encourage proponents of both styles to lay out fully articulated versions of their respective approaches. Rather than raising a priori objections, we should attempt to understand how the styles work themselves out and to evaluate them in terms of their fruitfulness in illuminating metaphysically significant relations and in solving metaphysical problems on a variety of fronts. (2006a: 212)

I agree. Instead of knock-down arguments in favor of one view or another, I propose instead to set out framework constraints—commitments that are generally taken to hold for those who endorse one or another of the specific styles of metaphysical explanation and then to explore various metaphysical benefits and costs for the Platonist committed to principle (S) and a broadly Aristotelian account of substance.

Recall that both styles of metaphysical explanation tell us that familiar substances exhibit whatever character they have in virtue of properties that they possess. Thus, we find the following framework constraint in play for both metaphysical styles:

Principle for Character Grounding (PCG): Properties explain the character things have.

The conjunction of PCG with the

Principle of Exemplification (PE): There are no unexemplified properties—all properties are exemplified by familiar substances (or, for properties which are exemplified by other properties, a descending chain of properties that bottoms out in a familiar substance)²⁷

is often thought to suggest a constituent strategy. On the other hand, the conjunction of PCG with the denial of PE is thought to suggest a relational strategy. As such, the acceptance or denial of PE is often viewed as a framework constraint for constituent or relational ontologists, respectively.

Consider the debate between the so-called Aristotelian and the Platonist. The Aristotelian accepts PE—there are no unexemplified properties. For the Aristotelian, it is natural to think that the properties responsible for the character of familiar substances are immanent in those
particulars (for there are no separately existing, or unexemplified, properties). Thus, properties confer character on familiar substances by being their constituents. On the other hand, consider the Platonist, who rejects PE—there are unexemplified properties. Clearly such properties cannot require their being immanent to familiar substances. Hence, properties exist “apart” from familiar particulars; they exist outside space and time, or in “Plato’s heaven.” And since it seems that many exemplified properties might have been unexemplified, if unexemplified properties are in “Plato’s heaven,” it is natural to place them in that heaven as well. The result is a two-realm view of reality—the non-spatial realm of abstract objects and the spatial realm of concrete particulars. Further, it is natural to think that concrete substances derive their character by standing in some non-mereological relation to these separately existing universals. If this is correct, then the acceptance of PE very naturally suggests the acceptance of the constituent strategy; the denial of PE very naturally suggests the acceptance of a relational strategy.

These arguments make for a familiar picture. Armstrong thinks the endorsement of PE naturally leads one to endorse a constituent approach, whereas its denial is more at home within the relational approach. He adds the additional claim that the relational approach is problematic because now familiar particulars are “bloblike” instead of “layer-caked.”

Once you have uninstantiated universals you need somewhere special to put them, a ‘Platonic heaven,’ as philosophers often say. They are not to be found in the ordinary world of space and time….Instantiation then becomes a very big deal: a relation between universals and particulars that crosses realms…. Such a view is unacceptable to Naturalists, that is, to those who think that the space-time world is all the world that there is….it seems that Platonic theories of universals have to treat particulars as bloblike rather than layer-caked….For on this view, what is it for a thing to have a property? It is not the thing’s having some internal feature, but rather its having a relationship, the instantiation relationship, to certain universals or Forms in another realm….I think that this is an argument against Platonic theories. (1989: 76-77)

Likewise, Loux thinks that PE and the constituent approach go hand in hand:
What we typically find is that those constituent ontologists who make universals constituents of objects endorse the principle of [exemplification] for those universals; and there can be no denying that there is something attractive, if not compulsory, in the coupling of these two ideas. If you think of basic first-order universals as things that confer character by being literal constituents in things, it is not unnatural to take the next step and write that constitutive role into the essence of those universals. (2006a: 238)

The picture, as articulated here by Armstrong and Loux, suggests that the acceptance of PE is a framework constraint for the constituent and relational approach. However, if it is a framework constraint, it isn’t a very strong one. Consider the following two questions:

Question 1: Are there unexemplified properties?

Question 2: Are properties constituents of the substances that have them?

Importantly, the issues expressed in Question 1 and Question 2 are independent from each other. By itself, belief in unexemplified properties says nothing about the way exemplified properties relate to the entities having them. And by itself, a commitment to properties exemplified in familiar substances says nothing about the existence or possibility of unexemplified properties (unless one identifies a properties’ existence with its exemplification, something the Platonist is loath to do). The constituent ontologist could reject PE and simply deny that unexemplified properties need to be “located” anywhere at all. On the other hand, the relational ontologist could consistently accept PE without endorsing the view that properties explain the character of substances by being literal constituents in them.  

The acceptance or denial of PE is suggestive of one approach or the other; still, the issue must be settled on other grounds. At bottom, it seems that the deciding factor will rest on one’s intuitions regarding how properties partially explain the character of substances. Armstrong expresses his intuition when he claims that the relational approach treats familiar substances as “bloblike” instead of “layer-caked.” The idea is that, in order to partially explain the character of a substance, properties should be understood as ingredients in the substance. Otherwise, it is a
“bloblike,” undifferentiated entity. Elsewhere Armstrong notes, “we normally think of particulars as something ‘containing’ its properties (or at least its non-relational properties)” (1978: 102). I take it that these are both ways of Armstrong expressing the intuition that properties need to be ingredients in familiar substances in order to partially explain a substance’s character. The relational ontologist will demur, arguing that all that is required is that the substance stands in the appropriate relation to its properties. It’s hard to see how to adjudicate between such claims.

Thus, the real issue concerns how character is partially explained by properties for familiar substances, not whether or not unexemplified properties exist. Fortunately, we do not need to decide on that issue. As it turns out, there are able Platonists who employ both ontological styles and have attempted to work out theories of substance and property amenable to (a) a theory of Platonic properties; and (b) a commitment to principle (S) and a broadly Aristotelian account of substance. The philosophers in question are Michael Loux (the relational ontologist) and J.P. Moreland (the constituent ontologist). In the final Section, I shall describe the Platonic Aristotelianism of Loux and Moreland at a sufficient level of detail to assess the metaphysical costs and benefits of each view.

3. The Platonic Aristotelianism of Loux and Moreland

In his book *Substance and Attribute*, Loux defends an abundant theory of Platonic properties and an Aristotelian account of substance. Loux motivates his particular substance-property account within the context of the problem of individuation. Frequently it is assumed that the Platonist has only two options in characterizing the ontological structure of substances: either the bundle theory or a substratum theory akin to the Lockean view discussed in Section 1. Loux argues that if these are the only two Platonist options, then a dilemma is surfaced: we must
either accept as necessarily true a principle that is at best only contingently true and probably false, i.e. a version of the Identity of Indiscernibles regarding pure properties,\(^\text{30}\)

$$\text{(II*)} \text{ Necessarily, for any substance, } a, \text{ and any substance, } b, \text{ if for any pure property, } P, \ P \text{ is an attribute of } a \text{ if and only if } P \text{ is an attribute of } b, \text{ then } a \text{ is identical with } b \text{ (ibid. 155)}$$
or we must appeal to an incoherent notion of bare substrata. Thus, the choice appears to be between a false principle and an incoherent notion.

What Loux needs is a kind of pure property associated with substances that presupposes numerical distinctiveness from other substances. If such an entity can be found, then we can find a way of “escape between the Scylla of bare particulars and the Charybdis of (II*)” (ibid. 159). Loux’s solution is to posit a different kind of property, a “substance-kind universal” that by itself diversifies the members which exemplify it. Three things are important to note about Loux’s account. First, Loux is a relational onotologist; second, Loux endorses a broadly Aristotelian account of substance (including principle (S)); and finally, Loux endorses Platonism regarding properties.\(^\text{31}\) In order to show these features of Loux’s account, I shall quote a lengthy paragraph of his:

A substance-kind is not one constituent of substances among others; it is not a constituent of substances at all. Being a member of its proper substance-kind is just what a substance is. On my account, then, substances do not turn out to be complexes or composites of constituents whose specification is the special province of the ontologist. What substances are and are essentially is members of substance-kinds; and this means that they cannot be bundles of properties or bundles of properties supported by [a bare particular]. They are simply substances – things like oak trees, human beings, and amoebae. And I take this point seriously; for I want to deny that universals other than substance kinds “make objects into” substances. In virtue of exemplifying its substance-kind, a thing is a full fledged substance numerically distinct from all other substances; and those universals that are not substance-kinds but are associated with substances are not further “ingredients” in substances; they are rather properties that substances possess and relations into which substances enter.

My account….is a descendant of an approach to substance that is expressed in many passages of Aristotle in which….he insists that substances are fundamental unities which cannot be reduced to more basic sorts of things. (ibid. 164-165)
That Loux is a relational ontologist and an Aristotelian regarding substance is clear from the above passage. What is interesting is that Loux postulates two kinds of universals in order to solve the problem of individuation. Some properties, namely, universals such as *being red* possess a nature such that their exemplification does not explain the particularity of the object that possesses it. Other properties, namely substance-kind universals such as *being human*, possess a nature such that their exemplification does explain (i.e., provides a metaphysical ground for) the particularity of the object that possesses it. Substance-kind properties “of and by themselves diversify their members” (ibid. 164). Loux summarizes: “Objects can exhibit precisely the same universals without incorporating some additional substratum [i.e., a bare particular] just because each object exhibits at least one universal, a substance-kind, whose instantiations are all numerically different” (ibid. 163). Loux’s substance-property account can be diagrammed as follows:

Without deciding whether or not the Platonist who endorses an Aristotelian account of substance should be a relational ontologist or a constituent ontologist, I shall note a key strength and weakness of each approach, as embodied by Loux and Moreland (to be discussed next). A key
strength to Loux’s substance-property account is the fact that it doesn’t require the postulation of a non-spatial sense of being “in” a familiar substance, something that will be required for the Platonist who is a constituent ontologist. Philosophers readily admit material objects and non-material (i.e., abstract) objects into their ontology. What is not so obvious is whether objects that are partially constituted by material objects and partially constituted by non-material (i.e., abstract) objects should be allowed. On the relational approach, this issue can be avoided.

The main weakness of the view is that it is not obviously an adequate solution to the problem of individuation. And if it is an adequate solution, it is not a theoretically elegant solution. Moreland goes so far as to claim that Loux’s “solution’ amounts to a mere assertion that there is no problem of individuation [for primary substances]” (1991: 93). In fact, according to Moreland, Loux’s substance account is just a version of nominalism dressed up in realist clothes. Assume Loux’s account does solve the problem of individuation. Still, his account is a disjunctive account of property roles, something that should be avoided if possible because of considerations related to theoretical simplicity and elegance. Regarding the problem of individuation, Loux gives an additional role to some properties, but not others, which is not desirable if it can be avoided. Consider the states of affairs “Socrates’ being white” and “Plato’s being white.” These two states of affairs exhibit an identical instance of whiteness in non-identical particulars. Socrates’ whiteness and Plato’s whiteness are individuated in virtue of the primary substance in each case, Socrates and Plato. But for the states of affairs “Socrates’ being human” and “Plato’s being human” the account of individuation is different. Socrates’ humanity and Plato’s humanity are individuated in virtue of each individual exemplifying a property (i.e., the substance-kind being human) that grounds the numerical diversity of the object that possesses it:
In the case of substance-kinds, however, there is no distinction between the objects which exhibit a universal and the various instantiations of the universal. The individuals who exhibit the universal, man, just are the instantiations of that universal, so that in the case of substance-kinds, there is no alternative to construing instantiations of each universal as numerically diverse. (Loux 1978: 161)

Loux’s point, as far as I understand it, is that individual substances always exemplify their substance-kind property whereas individual substances don’t always exemplify non-substance-kind properties, and this is supposed to be enough to show that the two properties are of a different nature. That is, on one hand, we don’t ever find an individual man without being human or an individual dog without being dog. On the other hand, we do find individual men and dogs that don’t exemplify being white. Thus, we can distinguish between the objects that have whiteness (the primary substance) and the instantiation of whiteness (i.e., Socrates whiteness and Plato’s whiteness) in a way not available for substance-kind properties.

Moreland is a Platonist who employs a constituent approach to substances, where substances are understood in the broadly Aristotelian manner articulated in Section 1. A familiar substance, Socrates, has the properties being human and being white in it as constituents. Since properties are non-spatiotemporal, they are in their instances (e.g., Socrates’ humaness, Socrates’ whiteness) by means of the primitive non-spatiotemporal relation of exemplification. Thus, e.g., the whiteness is in Socrates in the sense that Socrates has or exemplifies whiteness within its very being. Recall the distinction between “in” and “separate” as discussed at the beginning of Section 2. To be in a thing is to be a proper constituent of the thing, whereas to be separate is to exist apart from the thing, where the force of “separate” here is parasitic on its opposition to “in.” To be clear: to say whiteness is “in” Socrates is not (merely) to say whiteness “is exemplified by” Socrates. Rather, both the universal whiteness and the exemplification
relation are in Socrates as constituents. But neither *whiteness* nor the exemplification relation are spatial: properties are not in the concrete substances that have them like sand is in a bucket.

Moreland’s substance-property account is best understood in the context of the debate related to the problem of individuation. Recall Loux’s dilemma between accepting the Identity of Indiscernibles for pure properties and bare substrata—a principle that is most likely false and an incoherent notion. Moreland’s way out of the dilemma is to defend bare substrata against the incoherence charge. If the notion of bare substrata (hereafter, bare particulars) can be shown coherent, then there is a natural solution available to the Platonist for solving the problem of individuation for substances.

The incoherency charge against bare particulars is generally expressed as follows: to say bare particulars have no properties is to say that bare particulars have the property of *having no properties*, which is incoherent. A weaker version of the charge is: you say bare particulars have no properties, but obviously they do (such as the property *being simple*, *being a particular*, *being coloured if green*, etc.). Thus, bare particulars and any theory that employs them are hopeless.  

What exactly is a bare particular? Moreland basically endorses Gustav Bergmann’s classical definition of bare particulars:

Bare particulars neither are nor have natures. Any two of them are not intrinsically but only numerically different. That is their bareness. It is impossible for a bare particular to be ‘in’ more than one ordinary thing…A bare particular is a mere individuator…It does nothing else. (1967: 24-25)

Moreland infers from Bergmann’s definition three important facts related to the notion of a bare particular:

1. It is not a property or a relation, but rather a numerically primitive individual…
2. It does not “have” a nature nor does it “have” any properties at all.
3. Its only role is to be an individuator. (2001: 148)
Each of these facts needs some clarification. Facts 1 and 3 are “fairly straightforward and clear” (ibid). Socrates is an individual substance that has his own bare particular that individuates him from, say, Plato, who also has his own bare particular. So, “bare particulars constitute the ‘this’ and the ‘that’ of Socrates and Plato and are called ‘bare’ to distinguish them from other particulars (e.g., events, primary substances, quality-in-instances, [etc.])” (ibid). Minor point: Moreland says he is following G. Bergmann in thinking the only role a bare particular plays is that of individuator. But, this cannot be correct, for on Moreland’s account the bare particular is also the literal exemplifier of properties—hence it also plays a connecting role (between properties and a concrete particular, as well as between the abstract realm and the concrete).

In order to explicate (and make coherent) Fact 2, Moreland distinguishes between how a substance “has” a property and how a bare particular “has” a property. A bare particular, which is a simple, has “no internal differentiation within [it]” (ibid. 15). Hence, properties are tied to bare particulars. On the other hand, a substance “has” properties rooted within the substance itself. Properties are tied to substances in virtue of the exemplification relation—on this much the constituent and relational ontologist agree. On the constituent approach to substance articulated by Moreland, the property and exemplification relation are in the substance (as opposed to separate from the substance on the relational approach). Hence, “tied to” specifies the way properties are related to things (whether it be other abstract objects or concrete objects) and the “rooted within” locution is equivalent to “in.” Moreland summarizes:

A bare particular is called ‘bare’, not because it comes without properties, but in order to distinguish it from other particulars like substances and to distinguish the way it has a property (F is tied to x) from the way, say, a substance has a property (F is rooted within x). (ibid)

In sum, bare particulars are constituent-free simples even though they do “have” properties in the sense that properties are “tied to” them.
I don’t think that bare particular theory is incoherent. Further, I think that the Platonist can endorse an abundant theory of properties or a sparse theory and still coherently posit bare particulars. Moreland adopts a sparse theory of properties and argues that a bare particular does not exemplify essential properties. Moreland analyzes each true predicate expressible of a bare particular (‘is simple’, ‘is a particular’) in such a way as to avoid the corresponding property. I don’t think such a move is necessary. Why not hold instead that substances are complex entities that possess an intrinsic nature which is exhibited (and partially explained) by properties being literal constituents in the substance, whereas simple entities such as bare particulars do not? Moreland is a constituent ontologist regarding substance. It doesn’t follow that he is a constituent ontologist regarding every existent entity whatsoever, nor that one need be. Still, all the properties possessed by the substance (whether they are essential properties of the bare particular or properties of the substance) are exemplified by the bare particular and are constituents of the substance. A bare particular has no constituents, but (on an abundant theory of properties) it does have properties, and some essentially. I shall not pursue this point further but simply conclude thus: Moreland’s account of bare particulars is defensible and can accommodate both abundant and sparse theories of properties.

Given the reality of bare particulars, Moreland’s account of substance is slightly more complex that Loux’s. Now we have a whole (the substance) that possesses various constituents. Moreland’s substance account can be diagrammed as follows.
Consider the individual Socrates, a paradigm substance. Moreland would give an ontological assay as follows, starting from the bottom, and (roughly) moving up:

**Bare particulars.** Socrates is a this-such, and the thisness of Socrates is due to that fact that Socrates (i.e., the primary substance) has as a constituent, his own bare particular. As we’ve seen, Moreland is an ardent defender of bare particulars, arguing that they are needed in order to individuate particular substances.

**Properties.** As a Platonist, Moreland endorses the view that properties are abstract necessarily existing beings. Socrates has a number of properties, some contingently (such as *being white*) and some essentially (such as *being human*). Intuitively, essential properties are properties that make an object what it is, properties an object couldn’t possibly lack. Contingent properties, by contrast, are properties that an object happens to have but could have lacked.
The exemplification relation. At some point, the abstract realm of properties needs to be brought into the concrete realm of familiar substances. For Moreland, this takes place through the relation of exemplification. Exemplification is an undefined, irreducible relation that is non-spatial itself yet, in substances, ties an individuator and a property together. "This [relation] of exemplification is inhomogeneous in that it relates two entities that differ categorically; a universal and an individuator." As Grossmann states, the exemplification relation connects Plato’s two realms: “Without it, his two realms do not form a single unified world, but split apart. Without exemplification, [the] world splits into the universe and a realm of properties” (1992: 10). To be clear: when a substance is in view (as opposed to the exemplification of a property by a property), it is the bare particular that is the literal exemplifier of the property.

The inherence relation. Inherence is that relation by which a property is in a substance. Moreland endorses a broadly Aristotelian view of substance where a substance is a unified whole constituted by its various metaphysical and physical parts internal to, or within its being. Moreland states, “when a substance has a property, that property is ‘seated within’ and, thus, an expression of the ‘inner nature’ of the substance itself” (2001: 153). To distinguish property inherence from property exemplification, as we’ve seen, Moreland notes that properties are not simply tied to a substance (the way a property is tied to the substance’s individuator), but rather, properties are “rooted in…and caused by the substance” (ibid.). Further, just as there is essential and contingent property exemplification, there is essential and contingent property inherence. How are we to make sense of “rooted in” and “caused by the substance”? “Rooted in” is to be understood as the now familiar claim that properties are constituents of the substance. Regarding the kind of causation in view, it is final causation, as discussed in Section 1. As such, a substance’s properties are logically posterior to the whole when in a substance. The
exemplification of a substance’s properties by its individuator presupposes the substance as a whole. As Moreland and Rae state, “the unity of a substance springs from and resides within the substance and is due to the internal essence or nature of the substance that serves as its principle of unification. The parts and properties of [a substance] are due to the essence within it” (2000: 81).

A final question: is the inherence relation itself a constituent of the substance? In order to answer that question, the distinction between internal and external relations will be helpful. For Moreland, internal relations “are called internal because they actually enter into the being of—they partly constitute—the entity to which they are internal” (ibid. 54). On the other hand, external relations “are called external because they do not enter into the very being of the entities they relate in that those entities can exist and be themselves whether or not they enter into the external relation” (ibid.). In short, internal relations are constituents in things whereas external relationships are not. Based on this explication of the internal/external distinction for relations, it seems that the inherence relation must be internal, itself a non-spatial constituent of the substance particular. The substance particular is not indifferent to the properties with which it is related. As Moreland states, “the internal structure of a substance is a set of internal relations” (ibid. 82).

Substance particulars. Moreland endorses a broadly Aristotelian view of substance as explicated in Section 1. Substances are basic in the sense that “they are not in or had by things more basic than they. Substances do the having; properties are had” (ibid. 70). Further, the substance is a continuant that remains the same through change, grounds law-like change, and exhibits an irreducible teleology grounded in the essence of the substance. Moreland summarizes his Aristotelian account of substance (and his commitment to principle (S)) as
follows: “a substance is a primitive unity of properties, parts, and capacities. Moreover, the type of unity in a substance is to be explained by seeing the substance as a whole that is metaphysically prior to its parts in that the parts get their identity by the role they play in the substance as a whole” (ibid. 73).

This completes my description of the entities in a Morelandian substance (related to property possession, there undoubtedly are other constituents, at least in material substances). On Moreland’s account there are (at least) two relations that do the connecting and binding within a substance: the exemplification relation (which ties a property to a bare particular) and the inherence relation (which roots the property within a substance particular). As internal relations, these relations are literal constituents in the substance. What about the constituent relation that holds between the substance (i.e., the whole) and its constituent parts? As I stated above, not all relations are internal. Some relations are external. For Moreland, the constituent relation is not a constituent of substances.

We are now in a position to see how a quality instance is assayed for Moreland (in contrast to Loux) in explaining the unity and diversity of a thing. Consider the two quality instances Socrates’ whiteness and Socrates’ humanness. Also called “moments” by Moreland, these dependent metaphysical parts of the substance are concrete states of affairs that have three constituents: “the universal, a non-spatiotemporal [relation] of exemplification and an individuator” (ibid. 13). Of the three entities—two of them, the universal and the relation of exemplification—are non-spatiotemporal; yet, because of the individuator (for Moreland, it is a bare particular), the quality instance is itself spatiotemporally located. Further, both quality instances are analyzed in the same way (recall, for Loux they are analyzed in two distinct ways). The whiteness and humanness of Socrates is numerically identical to the whiteness and
humanness of Plato. And in both quality instances, the bare particular explains the individuality of Socrates and Plato (and the diversity between Socrates and Plato).

We are now in a position to state a key strength and weakness of Moreland’s substance-property account, best understood in contrast to the key strength and weakness of Loux’s account. A key strength is that it solves, in a straightforward and unified way, the problem of individuation for substances. The main weakness is that it requires its advocate to endorse a non-spatial sense of “in” for concrete particulars, a notion that is not obviously plausible and (minimally) a bit queer. The notion is not entirely opaque, however. Consider immaterial agents such as God or souls. It is plausible to endorse the claim that thoughts are in immaterial minds non-spatially. Perhaps one could argue, following the relational approach, that God or immaterial souls have thoughts in virtue of standing in some non-mereological relation to such thoughts and are thus not constituents in them non-spatially. In response to the suggestion of the relational approach, unlike properties, intuitively, thoughts are not the kinds of things that plausibly can exist apart from the substance that has them. So prima facie, it is more natural to think that thoughts must be in the substance that has them. And if the substance is immaterial, then they are in it non-spatially. If such considerations aren’t helpful, one can simply follow Moreland, who thinks that Platonism regarding properties requires a constituents approach to adequately solve the problem of individuation, and so too the notion of being “in” a substance non-spatially. It is just a cost of an otherwise fruitful metaphysical theory. A final point: the queerness factor is not just an issue for the Platonist who endorses a constituent approach to ontology. It can be argued that a substance has unseemly, even queer features for the Platonist given the relational approach as well. Consider Mark McPherran’s comments regarding such a relational approach to Platonism: A substance would be merely “a meeting place of a variety of insubstantial, ghostly
projections of other objects.”⁴³ The other objects of course are the Platonic properties so related. The Platonist who endorses a constituent approach to metaphysics can thus assert “Tu Quoque!” right back at the relational ontologist vis-à-vis the charge of queerness.⁴⁴

The moral of this Section is that the Platonist regarding properties who endorses an Aristotelian account of substance can be a relational or constituent ontologist and provide a plausible metaphysical account of the substance-property relation. Of course, there are costs associated with both approaches. And there are benefits to both as well. I shall leave it as an open question which approach should be taken regarding property exemplification and substance for the Platonist.

Acknowledgements I am grateful to J.P. Moreland and Javier Cumpa for many insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

1 Why assume properties are Platonic rather than Aristotelian? Without apology, I am a Platonist. Hence, as a Platonist, I am interested in exploring the ways that Platonic properties (some of them no doubt are universals such as being white, others perhaps are singularities such as being identical to Socrates) are had by substances. Arguments in favor of a Platonic conception of properties typically involve appeals to, inter alia, (a) the abstract nature of properties; (b) the necessary existence of properties; and (c) the possibility or reality of unexemplified properties. For further discussion of some of the common motivations in favor of a Platonic conception of properties, see Oliver (1996:27-28).

2 For further discussion on this topic, see Newman (1992:165-168).

3 For an interesting paper challenging these assumptions, see MacBride (2005).
4 So, substances are natural unities and fundamental unities.

5 This non-reductive account of substance avoids many difficulties and confusions that arise when engaging in “bottom-up” ontological analysis, where a substance is characterized solely in terms of its parts. To sight one recent example of such metaphysical confusion, see Benovsky (2008) where he repeatedly confuses the unifying role of a substratum (i.e., a bare particular) with the individuating role. On the Aristotelian view articulated here, the substance (at the level of the whole) plays the unifying role, and constituent parts (inter alia, properties, exemplification relationships, bare particulars) play other roles.


7 For a discussion of causal and conceptual explanation, see Schnieder (2006: 31-35), for metaphysical explanation, see Oliver (1996: 9).

8 Just what metaphysical explanation amounts to is difficult to spell out apart from citing examples. What I hope to make clear in the above examples is that, whatever it is, metaphysical explanation is not causal explanation (or if it is a kind of Aristotelian cause, it is a different sense than final causation). Minimally, a metaphysical explanation seeks to provide an account of metaphysical facts such as resemblance, talk of sameness of kind, the application of one predicate to an indefinite multitude of individuals, and so on.

9 In general, according to Schnieder, statements involving complex or elaborated concepts (i.e., colored, brother-in-law) are explained by recourse to more primitive concepts (i.e., red, married, sister). See Schnieder (2006:33).

10 By e.g., Moreland and Rae (2000: 71).

This discussion of bare substrata is distinct from the notion of bare particular to be shortly discussed when considering J.P. Moreland’s Aristotelian substance account.

Loux is quick to point out, however, that Aristotle doesn’t always appear consistent on this point. In a footnote immediately following the above quoted passage, Loux states “See e.g., Categories 5 as well as Metaphysics Z and H passim. But while much that Aristotle says about substance points in the direction of this sort of anti-reductionistic view, his doctrine of the hylomorphic structure of substance frequently leads him to make claims that are (at least apparently) opposed to a holistic account of substance” (ibid. 179).

See e.g., Loux (1978:1-106) and (2006b: 17-83).

Witness e.g., Plantinga (1974) where his freewill defense and modalized ontological argument utilize Platonic properties—individual essences, maximal greatness, and more—on almost every page.

I suppose we could also call it a kind of causal explanation. Still, it would be a different kind of causal explanation. On the Aristotelian terminology, F is the formal cause of x’s being F.


The following characterization of constituent and relational ontologies is from Smith (1997: 106-107). Smith’s characterization as quoted above is (said by Smith to be taken) from Alfred J. Freddoso, “Introduction to Ontology” lecture notes, Notre Dame University. Cf. also Newman (1992: 2) where he gives the same (basic)
characterization of constituent and relational ontologies in terms of immanent realism (i.e., Aristotelianism) and transcendent realism (i.e., Platonism).

21 See Bergmann (1967); Armstrong (1989); Newman (1992); Moreland (2001); and Smith (1997). Of course, the devil is in the details. Bergmann and Armstrong might wince at the above characterization of a constituent ontology, arguing instead that it is the category of fact or states of affairs that are the wholes so constituted. Whether states of affairs and facts are best understood as abstract entities or concrete structures is a hotly debated issue. One relevant issue is whether or not, given actualism, the concrete states of affairs view can accommodate the existence of nonobtaining but possible states of affairs. For an argument that they do not, see Plantinga (1983); for an argument that they do, see Wetzel (1998). Here, we shall not have to decide on this issue, since I will treat substances, not facts or states of affairs, as the possessor of properties on the constituent approach.

22 See Loux (2006a: 209) for a brief discussion of the category mistake objection. Basically, the idea is that abstract objects cannot coherently be construed as constituents, components, or ingredients of concrete particulars.

23 Armstrong (1989: 96-97). He suggest that in order to avoid the temptation to believe in unexemplified universals, we ought to think of properties as “ways things are” instead of “things” that can enjoy separate existence apart from concrete particulars.

24 Thus, a single-style approach to property possession for each kind of entity is preferable. Still, it could be the case that different kinds of entities admit different approaches to property possession. For example, it is reasonable to think that properties, numbers, and other abstracta possess properties in the relational way, even if e.g., substances possess properties in the constituent way.


26 As Aristotle argues against Plato (who separated the Forms from their instances) in Metaphysics, 1079b11-1080a10.
This principle is found in G. Bergmann (1967: 88) and Armstrong (1989: 75).

Armstrong wrongly assumes that all Platonist theories are relational theories (as his metaphor of particulars as bloblike suggests).

Loux (2006a: 237-238) makes both of these points.

Examples of pure properties are being red or being human, contrasted with impure, or relational, properties such as being identical to Socrates or being to the left of Mary. Loux rules out impure properties since they “incorporate determinate particulars and so they cannot be numbered among the ‘building blocks’ out of which particular substances are constituted.” Ibid., 133.

Loux makes the distinction between property universals and substance-kind universals, and argues that the latter are not properties. He is using a different sense of ‘property’ than the one I employ in this paper. For Loux, a property is a necessarily existing abstract object that does not explain the particularity of the object that possesses it and a substance-kind is a necessarily existing abstract object that does. I say both are Platonic properties as I use the term (i.e., an abstract necessarily existing entity that explains the character of the thing that has it). Loux does postulate at least two kinds of Platonic properties however.

Hence the title of his article, “How to be a nominalist in realist clothing.”

This complaint is discussed by inter alia Mertz (2001) and Loux (1978). Responses to this familiar complaint can be found by inter alia Moreland and Pickavance (2003) and Sider (2006).

See Moreland and Pickavance (2003).

Moreland’s account of substance as diagrammed here had to be reconstructed from his writing’s on the topic over roughly a 10-year period (1991-2001, see bibliography). His account of property exemplification and
substance shifted subtly over this decade, and I have confirmed through personal email correspondence (dated 8/16/10) that the following characterization does in fact represent accurately Moreland’s considered views on the topic.

36 Moreland (2001: 99). In order to avoid Bradley regress worries, Moreland thinks of relations as “the sort of things that do not need to be related to their relata before they can relate those relata to each other….As a primitive metaphysical fact, exemplification is an unmediated linker of properties to other properties or particulars” (ibid. 116).

37 Thus, in Chisholm’s familiar style, it is true in a “loose and popular” sense that Socrates exemplifies whiteness (for example), but false in a “technical or philosophical” sense since it is the individuator that is the literal exemplifier of properties.

38 For a good summary of Moreland’s broadly Aristotelian account of substance, see (ibid. 70-85).

39 I say at least two relations, since I am primarily concerned with properties as diagrammed above. I will leave it as an open question as to whether there are other internal relations that connect other metaphysical parts within a substance. Note, for Moreland, that the notion of ‘constituent’ “ranges over parts, separable and inseparable (e.g., Husserlian moments), properties, internal relations within some whole, and, indeed, all entities whatsoever that enter into the being of some whole” (2001: 142).

40 Moreland states, “It is widely recognized that when a universal is exemplified by a particular, the resulting state of affairs (the having of the universal by the particular) is itself a particular. This has been called the victory of particularity” (2001: 63). Thus, Moreland endorses the following (reasonable) principle: any substance that has as a constituent a concrete (metaphysical or physical) part is itself concrete.

41 Of course, if the substance in question is non-spatial, then the quality instance will be non-spatial as well.
After a lengthy argument against Wolterstorff and Armstrong, Moreland states: “If one accepts a realist construal of properties, then one must also embrace some type of individuator that is not a normal property (e.g., an impure property) or is not a property at all, or else the position collapses into moderate nominalism [as Moreland claims Wolterstorff and Armstrong’s accounts do]” (2001: 94-95). See also Moreland (1991).


It is often said that the constituent ontologist must deny the fact that there are necessary truths about universals. Since (setting God aside) there are no necessary individuals, it follows that there are no necessary properties as well. All properties exist contingently in contingent substances. Hence, “Truths about colors, triangles and numbers are thus contingent also (this is plainly a bullet which all constituent ontologist must bite, and without compunction)” says Barry Smith (2006: 110). Not so for the constituent ontologist who is a Platonist regarding properties. She can happily affirm necessary truths about properties since they too exist necessarily (and hence, ground the truth of singular propositions about them). This is an additional benefit to the constituent approach for the Platonist.